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Abstract
This Article covers the history of consular notification and presentation
in the U.S. federal and state courts and in the International Court of Justice.
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations provides that
nation-states should notify detained foreign nationals of their right to
contact their consulate about their detention. This Article argues that the
U.S. Supreme Court, as a matter of institutional responsibility and judicial
economy, should have concluded that the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations does not contain an enforceable individual right. Moreover, no
analog for this right has been found in American jurisprudence.
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INTRODUCTION
Medellín v. Texas,1 decided in 2008, was the last in a long line of U.S.
Supreme Court cases that dealt with the issue of consular notification.
After all of the litigation, a key question remains unanswered: whether
foreign nationals detained in the United States have enforceable individual
rights under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
(the VCCR). Article 36 of the VCCR ostensibly requires countries that
ratified the VCCR to provide certain notifications to foreign nationals that
they detain or arrest within their borders and to the consulates of those
foreign nationals.2 Because the United States is a signatory nation, its
failure to provide such notice in several instances has generated a number
of lawsuits.3 Foreign nationals have assumed that the VCCR provides
enforceable individual rights and have asked courts to decide the scope of
remedies available to them under domestic and international law.4
In Medellín, the U.S. Supreme Court assumed the VCCR provided an
enforceable individual right when it concluded no remedy existed for
criminal defendants deprived of their supposed right to consular
notification.5 Respectfully, as a matter of institutional responsibility and
judicial economy, the U.S. Supreme Court should have decided both issues
in the negative. This alternative, and perhaps more appropriate, holding
would have been that the VCCR does not create an individual right nor
does it require nation-states to recognize or create such rights. Moreover,
the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to acknowledge a foothold for this
right under the requirements of due process or under any existing federal or
state law. By failing to definitively determine that the VCCR does not
create an enforceable individual right to consular notification, the U.S.
1. 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
2. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 101,
596 U.N.T.S. 261, 262 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (entered into force with respect to the
United States of America on Dec. 24, 1969).
3. See, e.g., Medellín, 552 U.S. 491; see also Margaret E. McGuinness, Medellín, Norm
Portals, and the Horizontal Integration of International Human Rights, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
755, 799–823 (discussing cases).
4. See, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006).
5. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 509, 513–14.
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Supreme Court encourages foreign nationals to invoke this so-called right
in litigation. Consequently, lower courts are compelled to explain how and
why this “consular right” is not really a right, and then why courts may not
enforce it in a particular context. The U.S. Supreme Court’s apparent
reluctance to recognize an individual right means advocates of such a right
must rely on federal or state legislative action to create a statutory remedy
or basis for this right.
Although the VCCR does not appear to create an enforceable individual
right, the Treaty remains important to U.S. foreign policy. Due to the large
number of Americans overseas, the United States has a vested interest both
in honoring the VCCR consular notification requirements and in having
other signatory nations honor this agreement with regard to American
citizens. Additionally, undisputed international obligations upon the U.S.
government are contained in the Treaty and should be observed. These
obligations may be met through current State Department efforts to educate
state and local law enforcement and lawyers about the VCCR.
Although the VCCR is a signed treaty, the scope of its enforceability
remains unclear. To analyze this issue in depth, it is necessary first to
examine the history of consular notification in the United States,
particularly the interplay between the U.S. Supreme Court and the
International Court of Justice (ICJ). As no international foundation exists
for the right to consular notification, U.S. constitutional protections could
be the only intrinsic, domestic source of such a right. Even without such a
foothold, of course, federal and state legislatures are free to create remedies
for Article 36 violations. However, as of the publication of this Article,
neither Congress nor any state legislatures have created any remedies. The
U.S. Supreme Court could have easily avoided these difficult decisions
about presidential power, treaty interpretation, and the efficacy of the ICJ
holdings—as well as promoted judicial economy—if it merely held in
Medellín that an enforceable individual right to consular notification did
not exist.
I. THE UNITED STATES AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR
RELATIONS
There is a long history of litigation concerning consular notification
under the VCCR. The issues in litigation often implicate individual U.S.
state interests, and attempt to clarify the relationship and authority between
the United States and the ICJ.
A. The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
The story of consular notification litigation in the United States begins
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with the VCCR itself.6 By its terms, the VCCR appears to create privileges
and immunities for nation-states to promote the maintenance of
international peace and security. The VCCR was enacted “not to benefit
individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of functions by consular
posts on behalf of their respective [nation-states].”7 In 1969, the United
States ratified the VCCR and the Optional Protocol concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the Vienna Convention (the
Optional Protocol).8 Initially, forty-eight countries signed the VCCR;
today, 176 countries are party to the VCCR.9 Initially, twenty-nine
countries signed the Optional Protocol, and today sixty-nine countries have
agreed to be bound by it.10
Article 36 of the VCCR is most relevant to the issue of consular
notification:
It provides that if a person detained by a foreign country ‘so
requests, the competent authorities of the receiving [nationstate] shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the
sending [nation-state]’ of such detention, and ‘inform the
[detainee] of his righ[t]’ to request assistance from the consul
of his own state.11
In fact, the detainee must be informed of these rights “without delay.”12
To meet the United States’ obligations, the U.S. Department of State
recommends that authorities inform foreign nationals of these Article 36
provisions.13 The United States entered into additional agreements with
fifty-seven countries to make consular notification mandatory when the
United States detains their nationals.14
6. The history of consular notification litigation in the United States and internationally
through the ICJ is complex. Please refer to Appendix A for a timeline of important events.
7. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, 21 U.S.T. at 79, 596 U.N.T.S. at 262.
8. Id.; Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963,
21 U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 487 [hereinafter Optional Protocol] (entered into force with respect to
the United States of America on Dec. 24, 1969).
9. VCCR Status as at January 15, 2014, UN TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pag
es/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=III-6&chapter=3&lang=en.
10. Optional Protocol Status as at January 15, 2014, UN TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.
un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=III-5&chapter=3&lang=en.
11. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 499 (2008) (third and fourth alterations in original)
(quoting Vienna Convention, supra note 2, 21 U.S.T. at 101, 596 U.N.T.S. at 292).
12. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, 21 U.S.T. at 101, 596 U.N.T.S. at 292.
13. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CONSULAR NOTIFICATION AND ACCESS 7 (4d ed. 2014)
[hereinafter DEP’T OF STATE MANUAL], available at http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/travel/CNA
trainingresources/CNAManual_Feb2014.pdf. However, as this Article argues, this exists as a
nation’s prerogative to create such agreements and is not a basis of individual enforcement. See
generally 3 SHANE DIZON & NADINE K. WETTSTEIN, IMMIGRATION LAW SERVICE § 16:4 (2d ed.
2013) (explaining that although a majority of courts hold that Article 36 of VCCR does not confer
rights enforceable by individuals, a minority hold otherwise).
14. DEP’T OF STATE MANUAL, supra note 13, at 4, 7.
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The Optional Protocol provides that any dispute between members that
arises out of the interpretation or application of the VCCR be brought
before the ICJ.15 But only nation-states have the ability to resolve disputes
over a treaty via the ICJ; no individual has standing in that court.16 The ICJ
can gain jurisdiction over nation-states through special agreements, dispute
settlement clauses in a treaty, use of the optional clause, or forum
prorogatum.17 However, unless a nation consents, the ICJ lacks jurisdiction
to hear a case against that nation.18 In the case of the VCCR, a dispute
settlement clause in the Optional Protocol gives the ICJ jurisdiction.19
It is only after prosecution progresses to a point where state procedural
default rules preclude a domestic court from hearing VCCR-related claims
that many foreign nationals detained in the United States become aware of
the option to contact their consulate.20 The ICJ and other signatory nations

15. Optional Protocol, supra note 8, 21 U.S.T. at 326, 596 U.N.T.S. at 488.
16. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 34, para. 1, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055,
1059 [hereinafter ICJ Statute] (“Only states may be parties in cases before the Court.”); see also
Martin Scheinin, The ICJ and the Individual, 9 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 123, 124 (2007)
(“Procedurally, individuals do not have access to the Court, or standing before the Court.”).
17. See ICJ Statute, supra note 16, art. 36, para. 1 (gaining jurisdiction through a special
agreement); id. art. 37 (gaining jurisdiction through dispute settlement clauses in a treaty); id. art.
36, para. 2 (gaining jurisdiction through the use of the optional clause); BARRY E. CARTER & ALLEN
S. WEINER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 299, 301, 306, 318–19 (6th ed. 2011) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL
LAW]; see also Yury A. Kolesnikov, Meddling with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations:
The Dilemma and Proposed Statutory Solutions, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 179, 187 (2009)
(explaining that parties must consent to the ICJ’s jurisdiction for it to be effective, and detailing
some ways in which they may do so). The optional clause refers to Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute,
which allows countries to consent in advance to compulsory jurisdiction for any international
dispute that arises with another country that also opted in through the optional clause. ICJ Statute,
supra note 16. Forum prorogatum is another doctrine by which the ICJ gains jurisdiction. See
Sienho Yee, Forum Prorogatum and the Advisory Proceedings of the International Court, 95 AM.
J. INT’L L. 381, 381 (2001). By that doctrine, a party may invite its adversary into court, even after
proceedings have already been instituted, by submitting an application to the court. See id.
18. INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 17, at 301; Kolesnikov, supra note 17, at 187.
19. Optional Protocol, supra note 8, 21 U.S.T. at 326, 596 U.N.T.S. at 488. However, after
the ICJ’s decision in Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12, ¶ 153 (Mar. 31), which ruled against the United States, the United States
withdrew from the Optional Protocol on March 7, 2005, and deprived the ICJ of its jurisdiction.
Kolesnikov, supra note 17, at 188.
20. Cf. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. ¶¶ 113–14 (noting that “procedural default rule[s] may continue to
prevent . . . Mexico, in a timely fashion, from . . . assisting in [the] defence [sic]” of certain
nationals and that “moreover . . . in several of the cases cited in Mexico’s final submissions the
procedural default rules have already been applied, and . . . in others it could be applied at
subsequent stages in the proceedings”). State procedural default rules require that defendants
present claims to state courts before they present claims to a federal court. LaGrand Case (Ger. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. 466, ¶ 23 (June 27). If a defendant attempts to raise a new issue in a
habeas proceeding, the defendant may do so only if the defendant shows cause, obvious prejudice,
and that some external impediment prevented him from raising the issue earlier. Id.
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note these repeated notification lapses.21 However, many of these failures
can be attributed to confusion over implementation of the Treaty within the
United States’ federal and state governments and to disagreements between
the United States and the international community.
B. States and the VCCR Without Federal Guidance
Following the ratification of the VCCR, a struggle ensued between the
states and federal government over its implementation. Under principles of
federalism, states were understandably reluctant to alter state procedural
rules to conform to nebulous international expectations.22 After the United
States became a signatory to the VCCR, there was little direction from the
federal government to the states on what role the states played in handling
these federal obligations.23 For example, in June 1986, the state of Texas
convicted Irineo Tristan Montoya of capital murder and sentenced him to
death.24 Montoya, a Mexican national, petitioned then-Texas Governor
George W. Bush for leniency and a stay of execution because of the failure
of Texas authorities to notify the Mexican consulate of Montoya’s
21. See Report: U.S. Operates Double Standard when Mexicans are Arrested for Murder,
ABELINE REPORTER-NEWS (Sept. 29, 1997), http://www.texnews.com/texas97/execute092997.html
[hereinafter Double Standard] (reporting Mexico formally complained to the State Department
about repeated violations of Article 36 of the VCCR, alleging that “[i]n every capital punishment
case, Mexican consulates were not notified until after their citizens had been convicted and
sentenced to death”); cf. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. ¶¶ 113–14 (noting that the procedural default rule
prevented Mexico from rendering legal assistance to certain nationals and could continue to do so);
LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. ¶ 91 (holding that the United States failed to timely comply with its
obligation to inform the LaGrands of Germany’s right, at their request, to render them legal
assistance, and, because of the operation of the procedural default rule, nothing could be done to
remedy such malfeasance); Linda E. Carter, Lessons from Avena: The Inadequacy of Clemency and
Judicial Proceedings for Violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 15 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 259, 270–71 (2005) (stating that the procedural default rule is the “primary
restriction . . . that affects access to a hearing on the VCCR,” in large part because “exceptions to
procedural default are invoked sparingly”).
22. See, e.g., Amnesty International: Violation of the Rights of Foreign Nationals Under
Sentence of Death, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER (1998) [hereinafter Amnesty
International], http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/802 (stating that, as of 1998, “most state and
local authorities remain[ed] ignorant of their [responsibilities under Article 36 of the
VCCR] . . . . [d]espite sporadic advisory notices from the State Department,” and reporting that, in
the criminal proceedings against Irineo Tristan Montoya, Texan officials told the State Department
that Texas “refused to investigate [Texas’s] violation [of Article 36 of the VCCR] or to assess its
possible impact, on the grounds that Texas was not a signatory to the Vienna Convention”).
23. See Kelly Trainer, Comment, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in the United
States Courts, 13 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 227, 230 (2000) (stating that, as of 2000, “American courts . . .
continually found ways to keep from affording foreign nationals their rights under the Vienna
Convention. The Supreme Court . . . refused to rule on the matter, leaving the lower federal and
state courts confused and divided”).
24. Montoya v. State, 810 S.W.2d 160, 161, 165–66 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en banc), rev’d
in part sub nom. Montoya v. Scott, 65 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 1995).
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detention, as required under Article 36 of the VCCR.25
The sentencing judge, the local district attorney, the Texas Attorney
General’s Office, and the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles strongly
opposed a reprieve.26 Additionally, serious policy considerations
influenced the Governor’s decision. A grant of reprieve would raise
sensitive and difficult questions regarding the validity of other types of
state convictions.27 If a treaty violation could be the basis for reversing or
remanding a conviction for capital murder, then why not also one for DWI,
assault, or robbery? At the time approximately eleven Mexican nationals
resided on death row in Texas.28 If Governor Bush granted a reprieve in the
Montoya case, then he and future governors would be pressured to grant a
reprieve in similar cases in which consular notifications had not been
provided. The Governor did not want to establish such a precedent.29
Due to the wide publicity at the time, the Mexican government and the
Mexican consul in Brownsville, Texas almost certainly knew of the arrest
and trial.30 Additionally, according to an affidavit from the Mexican consul
in Brownsville, his government received official notice of Montoya’s
conviction.31 Therefore, the Mexican government had sufficient
opportunity to advise Montoya’s lawyer about the United States’ alleged
treaty violation. If the Mexican government had advised Montoya’s lawyer,
then procedural default rules would not have barred Montoya from raising
the VCCR violation on direct and habeas appeal.
Montoya was executed in June 1997.32 Afterwards, the Mexican
government launched a formal complaint with the U.S. federal government

25. Michael Fleishman, Note, Reciprocity Unmasked: The Role of the Mexican Government
in Defense of Its Foreign Nationals in United States Death Penalty Cases, 20 ARIZ. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 359, 379–80 (2003).
26. Cf. Pauline Arrillaga, Prison Board Rejects Request to Commute Montoya’s Sentence,
ABILENE REPORTER-NEWS (June 18, 1997), http://www.texnews.com/texas97/reject061897.html
(reporting that the state attorney general’s office did not return the newspaper’s calls, and the Texas
Board of Pardons and Paroles stated that defendants “have to make a good case for swaying the
board to recommend such changes,” but Montoya’s request for reprieve simply “was not strong
enough”).
27. Personal Account of Alberto R. Gonzales, former General Counsel to Texas Governor
George W. Bush, 2005–2007.
28. Double Standard, supra note 21.
29. Personal Account of Alberto R. Gonzales, supra note 27.
30. See Fleishman, supra note 25, at 377–78 (reporting that Mexico began to take action on
Montoya’s behalf after his conviction in the lower court and before his habeas appeal); see also
Sam Dillon, Mexico Reacts Bitterly to Execution of One of Its Citizens in Texas, N.Y. TIMES (June
20, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/06/20/world/mexico-reacts-bitterly-to-execution-of-oneof-its-citizens-in-texas.html (indicating that the trial generated wide publicity).
31. Personal Account of Alberto R. Gonzales, supra note 27.
32. Texas Executes Mexican, Prompting More Protests, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 1997)
[hereinafter Texas Executes Mexican], http://www.nytimes.com/1997/06/19/us/texas-executesmexican-prompting-more-protests.html.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 3

692

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

over his treatment. 33 The Department of State inquired several times into
the matter and asked whether a violation of the VCCR occurred.34 The
state of Texas acknowledged that it appeared as though the state did not
provide consular notification to Montoya at the time of his detention, but
argued that it was not the state’s role to confirm any violation of the
VCCR.35 From the state’s perspective, Montoya committed a horrific crime
in Texas and received a fair trial.36 The state deferred to the federal
government to deal with Mexico and the ramifications of a possible VCCR
violation.
Following Montoya’s execution, Texas and other states continued to
stop, detain, and convict Mexican nationals without providing consular
notification.37 Over time, this practice led to greater tension with Mexico
and the ICJ, setting the stage for additional litigation.
C. The Supreme Court Starts the Dialogue
In 1998, the state of Virginia prepared to execute Angel Francisco
Breard, a citizen of Paraguay, for attempted rape and capital murder.38
Breard raised for the first time in his habeas petition that his treatment in
the state of Virginia violated the VCCR because the state never informed
him of his consular rights.39 Breard’s claim was continually rebuffed in the
courts; he procedurally defaulted because he failed to raise the issue in
33. Dillon, supra note 30.
34. Personal Account of Alberto R. Gonzales, supra note 27; Fleishman, supra note 25, at
379; Amnesty International, supra note 22.
35. Personal Account of Alberto R. Gonzales, supra note 27. As stated in a 1997 letter to the
Department of State:
Since the State of Texas is not a signatory to the Vienna Convention . . ., we
believe it is inappropriate to ask Texas to determine whether a breach of Article
36 . . . occurred . . . . [Additionally,] I felt it would be inappropriate for the
Governor’s Office to give an opinion regarding the consequences and materiality
of any breach of the treaty . . . .
Letter from Alberto Gonzales, Gen. Counsel to Governor of Tex., to Michael J. Matheson, Acting
Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State (June 16, 1997), reprinted in JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S. 498–99 (2d ed. 2005) (second alteration in
original).
36. Personal Account of Alberto R. Gonzales, supra note 27; see also Brief of Respondent,
Respondent’s Brief in Opposition, Montoya v. Johnson, 517 U.S. 1133 (1996) (No. 95-1003), 1996
WL 33467927 (arguing on behalf of Texas that the Petitioner’s conviction was fair and legally
sound despite alleged defects); Texas Executes Mexican, supra note 32 (“Gov. George W. Bush
refused to grant him [Montoya] a 30-day reprieve, saying he had received a fair trial.”).
37. See, e.g., United Mexican States v. Woods, 126 F.3d 1220, 1222–23 (9th Cir. 1997);
Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97, 99–101 (4th Cir. 1997); State v. Loza, No. CA96-10-214,
1997 WL 634348, at *1–2 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 13, 1997).
38. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 372–73 (1998).
39. Id. at 373.
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state court.40 Breard argued that the VCCR should trump the procedural
default doctrine.41 The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed and reminded him
that the provisional rights of the Constitution had to conform to procedural
default rules, and so too, did treaties.42 Beyond the scope of domestic law,
the Court held “it has been recognized in international law that, absent a
clear and express statement to the contrary, the procedural rules of the
forum [nation-state] govern the implementation of the treaty in that
[nation-state].”43
In other words, it was up to the United States and individual states to
make rules to govern the implementation of the VCCR with respect to
procedural default rules. Even the VCCR itself noted that the Convention
“shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the
receiving [nation-state], provided that said laws and regulations must
enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded
under this article are intended.”44 As long as domestic laws do not interfere
or inhibit the rights granted by the VCCR, states should give full effect to
domestic laws. The notion that international obligations should not
override domestic laws where possible is meant to encourage greater
nation-state support and participation in the VCCR.
In addition to its affirmance of the principle that the VCCR was subject
to state procedural default rules, Breard is perhaps best known for its
confirmation, in this context, of the “last-in-time rule.”45 Even if the
VCCR was not itself subject to rules of procedural default, there was
another basis for the courts to deny Breard relief. The Court reasoned that
because the Constitution recognizes treaties as the supreme law of the land,
if a treaty and federal statute conflict, then the most recently effectuated

40. Id.
41. Id. at 375. Paraguay later argued to the ICJ that the United States violated Paraguay’s
rights as a nation-state through the U.S. officials’ failure to notify Breard of his ability to contact his
consulate and through the subsequent nullification of this ability through procedural default rules.
Application of the Republic of Paraguay (Para. v. U.S.), ¶¶ 24(a)–(e) (Apr. 3 1998), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/99/7183.pdf. Breard’s execution rendered the case moot, though
it was still in process in the ICJ at that time. Christopher E. van der Waerden, Death and
Diplomacy: Paraguay v. United States and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 45
WAYNE L. REV. 1631, 1639 (1999) (citing Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures (Para.
v. U.S.), ¶ 37 (Apr. 9 1998), available at http://iilj.org/courses/documents/CaseConcerningtheVien
naConventiononConsularRelations-Paraguayv.USA.pdf).
42. Breard, 523 U.S. at 376 (“Although treaties are recognized by our Constitution as the
supreme law of the land, that status is no less true of provisions of the Constitution itself, to which
rules of procedural default apply.”).
43. Id. at 375.
44. Id. (citing Vienna Convention, supra note 2, 21 U.S.T. 77, 101, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, 262).
45. See Emily S. Bremer, The Dynamic Last-in-Time Rule, 22 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 27,
36 (2012); Charles B. Radlauer, A Clash of Power and Jurisdiction: The United States Supreme
Court v. The International Court of Justice, 11 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 489, 503–04 (1999).
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treaty or federal statute—the one last-in-time—will control.46 As noted
earlier, the VCCR has been in effect since 1969. More recently, in 1996
Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act,
which provides that a habeas petitioner who alleges violations of treaties
cannot receive an evidentiary hearing if he fails to develop in state court
proceedings the factual basis of the claim.47 Because this Act was last-intime in relation to the VCCR, the most recent law controlled and
extinguished Breard’s claim.48
D. The International Court of Justice Responds
Three years after the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Breard, the ICJ
ruled on a similar case that involved foreign nationals detained in the
United States.49 Karl and Walter LaGrand were citizens of Germany but
were arrested in Arizona in the course of an attempted bank robbery that
took the life of the bank manager and seriously injured another bank
employee.50 The trial court sentenced them to death, and they filed a
habeas petition with the U.S. District Court of Arizona, claiming a
violation of their rights under the VCCR.51 The court rejected that claim
under procedural default rules.52 During the proceedings, Germany filed an
action against the United States with the ICJ.53 Germany obtained
jurisdiction based on the Optional Protocol both countries had signed.54
The United States conceded during the course of the ICJ’s investigation
that the responsible Arizona authorities failed to inform the LaGrands of
their right to consular notification, even after the Arizona authorities
became aware of their German nationality.55 Therefore, the ICJ concluded
that the United States “violated its obligations under . . . the Vienna
Convention.”56 The ICJ issued a provisional order in an attempt to stay the
executions pending a final decision on the merits.57
Germany argued that the procedural default rules created the tension

46. Breard, 523 U.S. at 376 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957) and Whitney v.
Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888)).
47. Id. at 376; see also Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1219.
48. As the Act did not allow Breard to have an evidentiary hearing, he could not prove how
the violation of the VCCR prejudiced him. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), (e)(2) (Supp. IV 1994)).
49. LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. 466, ¶¶ 13–14 (June 27).
50. Id.
51. Id. ¶¶ 14, 23.
52. Id. ¶ 23.
53. Id. ¶ 1. This was after diplomatic efforts had failed.
54. Id. ¶ 128(1).
55. Id. ¶ 15.
56. Id.
57. Id. ¶ 32. Despite the ICJ order, the LaGrands were executed. Id. at ¶ 34.
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inherent in the LaGrands’ claim.58 The United States’ failure to meet its
obligation under the VCCR made it impossible for the brothers to raise this
claim in line with the procedural default rules.59 The United States’ breach
of its obligations to inform the LaGrands of their rights was the reason why
they did not raise their claim in a timely fashion.60 The ICJ determined that
Article 36 created individual rights for the detained person.61 The ICJ also
concluded that while the procedural default rules did not violate the
VCCR, they nevertheless proved problematic because they denied a
foreign nation the opportunity to raise violations of the VCCR.62 The ICJ
ordered the United States to permit “review and reconsideration” of the
LaGrands’ case in light of the established violations.63 The ICJ warned the
United States that if it denied this review, it would further breach its
obligations to Germany.64
Although this case is an example of the ICJ’s willingness to issue
orders that relate to the rights of individuals, the ICJ’s decision reinforced
the principle that the VCCR is a treaty between nation-states and is
intended to define rights and obligations between nation-states. While the
ICJ determined that the VCCR created individual rights, the invocation of
those individual rights was up to the individual’s nation-state (in this case,
Germany).65 Moreover, because the LaGrands were executed in 1999, two
years before the ICJ issued its final decision,66 even Germany could not
receive remedy.67
The meaning and scope of the VCCR remained unsettled when the ICJ
was again called to resolve a dispute regarding Article 36 of the VCCR in
Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, decided in March
2004.68 In 2003, Mexico brought suit against the United States and argued
that, in fifty-two cases that spanned nine states, the United States had
violated the VCCR.69 One of these cases involved Jose Ernesto Medellín

58. Id. ¶ 11(2).
59. Id. ¶¶ 81–82.
60. Id.
61. Id. ¶¶ 77, 89.
62. Id. ¶ 90.
63. Id. ¶ 128(7).
64. See id. ¶ 125 (stating that although the ICJ did not impose material penalties, the ICJ
would impose penalties in any susequent similar situation).
65. Id. ¶ 77 (“[T]he Court concludes that Article 36, paragraph 1, creates individual rights,
which . . . may be invoked in this Court by the national State of the detained person.”).
66. See World Court Rules Against U.S., Says Germany’s Rights Violated, AMARILLO GLOBENEWS (June 28, 2001), http://amarillo.com/stories/2001/06/28/usn_rules.shtml.
67. See Legrand, 2001 I.C.J. ¶¶ 123–28.
68. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, ¶ 54 (Mar. 31).
69. Id. ¶ 15. These cases occupied various stages of U.S. litigation: twenty-four remained in
direct appeal, twenty-five exhausted direct appeal but post conviction relief was still available at the
state or federal level, and three cases existed in which no judicial remedy remained. Id. ¶ 20.
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Rojas.70
The United States unsuccessfully objected at the outset to the
jurisdiction of the ICJ in this matter.71 The ICJ insisted that the issue was a
“question of interpretation of the obligations imposed by the Vienna
Convention” that was proper under the Optional Protocol.72 The ICJ also
determined it was competent to review the merits of the case and to impose
remedies if it found a breach.73
The United States then argued that it is difficult to discern who might
be a foreign national because the language that a person speaks, or his
appearance, might not indicate whether he is a foreign national.74 The ICJ
suggested a routine inquiry into nationality and notification during
Miranda warnings and noted that “were each individual to be told at [the
time of detention] that, should he be a foreign national, he is entitled to ask
for his consular post to be contacted, compliance with this requirement
under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) would be greatly enhanced.”75 The ICJ
did not require this solution but only recommended it.76
Mexico also presented a due process argument and reasoned that:
Consular notification constitutes a basic component of due
process by ensuring both the procedural equality of a foreign
national in the criminal process and the enforcement of other
fundamental due process guarantees to which that national is
entitled, and . . . therefore [it is] an essential requirement for
fair criminal proceedings against foreign nationals.77
However, the ICJ found it unnecessary to attempt to define or enforce due
process.78
Instead, the ICJ focused on the existence of a nation-state’s duty to
inform an arrested person “as soon as it is realized that the person is a
70. Id. ¶ 16 (number thirty-eight of the fifty-two individuals).
71. Id. ¶¶ 26–35.
72. Id. ¶ 30.
73. Id. ¶¶ 30, 34.
74. Id. ¶ 64.
75. Id.
76. See id. (suggesting that such an inquiry would be “desirable” but going no further).
77. Id. ¶ 30 (internal quotation marks omitted). Mexico successfully made a similar argument
at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 1999. See Right to Information on Consular
Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC16/99, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 16, ¶¶ 26, 141.7 (Oct. 1, 1999) (successfully arguing that
foreign nationals have the right to consular assistance). However, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights executed zero enforcement of this judgment. Application Instituting Proceedings
(Mex. v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. No. 128, ¶ 66 (Jan. 9), available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/128/1913.pdf (“The Inter-American Court’s decision has had no apparent effect
on United States policy and practice.”).
78. See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 12, ¶¶ 30, 124 (reasoning that, while Mexico’s due process
contention may be correct, the court need not decide the merits of that issue).
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foreign national, or once there are grounds to think that the person is
probably a foreign national.”79 The United States violated this duty,80 and
the ICJ ordered the United States to make adequate reparations.81 The ICJ
did not require the partial or total annulment of convictions.82 Instead the
ICJ ordered review and reconsideration of each of the fifty-two cases to
ascertain actual prejudice to the defendant because of an Article 36
violation.83 The ICJ left the “concrete modalities” for such review to the
discretion of the United States.84 The ICJ also encouraged the United
States—much like it had ordered in LaGrand—to either revise the
procedural default rules or somehow prevent their application in cases
where a consular notification breach occurred.85
E. The Supreme Court Fails to Find a Remedy
The United States declined to prohibit the use of federal or state
procedural default rules as the ICJ suggested in Avena.86 Instead, the
United States allowed those cases to take their proper course through the
U.S. judicial system. However, the United States soon found itself dealing
again with its failure to give proper consular notification. In 2006 the U.S.
Supreme Court announced its decision in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon.87
Here, the Court set out to answer three distinct questions: (1) does the
VCCR grant rights that individuals may invoke in judicial proceedings; (2)
is suppression of evidence a proper remedy for an Article 36 violation; and
(3) is an Article 36 claim forfeited under state procedural default rules if a
defendant fails to raise the claim at trial?88
The first question the Court found “unnecessary to resolve.”89 The
Court “assume[d], without deciding, that Article 36 does grant . . . such
rights.”90 This assumption allowed the Court to sidestep the issue of
whether the VCCR was self-executing. If the Court denied suppression as a
79. Id. ¶ 88. There are two pieces to Article 36: the duty to inform detained foreign nationals
of their ability to contact the consulate and the duty to inform the consulate of the detention. See
Vienna Convention, supra note 2, 21 U.S.T. at 101, 596 U.N.T.S. at 1967. The latter duty appears
only if the detainee so requests, but the former duty exists on its own as part of the international
commitment of the VCCR. See supra Subsection I.A.
80. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 12, ¶ 90.
81. Id. ¶ 121.
82. Id. ¶ 123.
83. Id.
84. Id. ¶ 131.
85. Id. ¶ 113. The ICJ did note that the United States makes “good faith efforts” to require
law enforcement to give consular notification. Id. ¶ 149. The court took this as a commitment to
follow through with these efforts and not to remain a repeat offender. Id. ¶ 149–50.
86. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 355 (2006).
87. See id. at 331.
88. Id. at 337.
89. Id. at 343.
90. Id.
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remedy (regardless of whether the VCCR was self-executing), then it was
not necessary to determine if the treaty was self-executing.91 It also
allowed the Court to avoid the question of how to enforce an individual
right.
The Court contended that, as a federal court, it had limited authority
over state court proceedings (of which Sanchez-Llamas was a part) and
could intervene only “to correct wrongs of constitutional dimension.”92
The majority agreed that with no constitutional wrongs, any remedy
enforceable at the state level must spring from the VCCR. 93 Because the
VCCR provided no remedy, the Court declined to create one. If the Court
created a remedy, then the Court would exceed its judicial role and usurp
the power of Congress to ratify the terms and powers of a treaty.94
Sanchez-Llamas then argued that if the Court’s authority must come
from the VCCR to give Article 36 “full effect,” the Treaty must mandate a
judicial remedy of “some kind.”95 The Court rejected this argument and
noted that it was unaware of any other country that afforded a remedy for
violations of Article 36 in criminal prosecutions.96 Even if the Court were
to agree to some remedy, it maintained that it could not invoke
suppression, which falls under the auspices of the exclusionary rule.97
In answer to the second issue before the Court concerning whether
suppression was an appropriate remedy, the Court explained that it
primarily invoked the exclusionary rule for constitutional violations.98
Specifically, the exclusionary rule has been applied only to certain
violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments through improper searches,
seizures, and confessions extracted in violation of self-incrimination
principles and due process.99 Here, the Court found that a violation of
Article 36 was unrelated to searches, interrogations, or the gathering of
evidence; in other words the violation was unrelated to constitutional

91. As the Medellín decision makes clear, creating a rubric for distinguishing self-executing
treaties from non-self-executing treaties involved additional, lengthy analysis. Medellín v. Texas,
552 U.S. 491, 505–06 (2008). This may have served as the impetus for the U.S. Supreme Court to
avoid the discussion of the self-executing nature of the VCCR at this juncture.
92. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 345 (quoting Smith v. Phllips, 445 U.S. 209, 221 (1982)).
93. Id. at 346.
94. Id. at 347.
95. Id.
96. Id. (citing Supplemental Brief for the United States on Rehearing En Banc at A-8, United
States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56 (2000) (Nos. 97-2034, 2413, and 98-1129, 1230, 1447, 1448), 1999 WL
33891052).
97. Id. at 350. The exclusionary rule prohibits the prosecutorial use of unconstitutionally
seized evidence. See Weeks v. Michigan, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (prohibiting the federal
government from such use); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment extends the exclusionary rule to state proceedings).
98. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 348.
99. Id.
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concerns.100 Furthermore, because other procedural due process protections
existed for Sanchez-Llamas (the same as any criminal defendant in the
U.S. justice system), there was no need for a separate remedy for an Article
36 violation.101 A defendant could assert Article 36 violations along with
other claims or as a basis for a constitutional violation (e.g., that it rendered
a defendant’s assistance to the police involuntary), but an Article 36
violation did not need independent protection or remedy.102
After it found that suppression was an inappropriate remedy, even if a
right to consular notification existed, the Court moved to its third and final
question of whether a defendant forfeits an Article 36 claim under state
procedural default rules if a defendant fails to raise the claim at trial.103 The
Court’s precedent from Breard answered this issue.104 Every federal law,
including treaties and the Constitution, is answerable to the rule of
procedural default.105 Therefore, a defendant cannot introduce Article 36
claims in habeas petitions that a defendant failed to raise in state court
proceedings.106
In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding failed to address the
existence of the right to consular notification and its scope. Though the ICJ
had issued decisions regarding consular notification in both LaGrand and
Avena by this point, the Court ignored those decisions and found that the
judgments were “entitled only to the ‘respectful consideration’ due an
interpretation of an international agreement by an international court.”107 In
the final analysis, the ICJ’s interpretation of the VCCR did not persuade
the Court to reconsider its understanding of the United States’ domestic
obligations under the VCCR according to Breard.108 The case of Medellín
would provide no clearer picture of Article 36.
F. The Supreme Court Closes the Door
Virtually all legal commentators agree Medellín was a landmark U.S.
case in terms of treaty interpretation and the domestic presumption
regarding the enforceability of treaties.109 On close examination, Medellín
100. Id. at 349.
101. Id. at 350.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 350–51.
104. See id. at 351–52.
105. Id. at 356.
106. Id. at 357–58.
107. Id. at 355 (quoting Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1988)).
108. See id. at 350–51.
109. See, e.g., David J. Bederman, Medellín’s New Paradigm for Treaty Interpretation, 102
AM. J. INT’L L. 529, 530, 540 (2008) (“[T]he Medellín decision signifies a substantial break with
previous disputations between members of the Supreme Court as to the proper modalities of treaty
interpretation . . . . Textualism is placed as a first principle of construction . . . .”); Oona A.
Hathaway et al., International Law at Home: Enforcing Treaties in U.S. Courts, 37 YALE J. INT’L L.
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seemed to answer some questions, to muddle others, and to leave some
purposefully unresolved with respect to rights under the VCCR.
José Ernesto Medellín was arrested in 1993 for the rape and brutal
murders of two Houston teenagers.110 At the time of his arrest, Medellín
was given Miranda warnings, signed a waiver of his rights, and gave a
detailed written confession.111 However, law enforcement officers never
informed Medellín of the VCCR obligation, which would have allowed
him to notify the Mexican consulate of his detention.112
After the state trial court convicted Medellín and sentenced him to
death in 1997, Medellín raised his VCCR claim in his first application for
state post conviction relief.113 The court held that the claim was
procedurally deficient and that Medellín needed to raise this issue either at
trial or on direct review.114 Additionally, the trial court held Medellín lost
on the merits because he did not show that this “non-notification” to the
consulate impacted the validity of his conviction or punishment.115 In
2003, Medellín filed a habeas petition in federal court and was denied
relief on the same grounds.116
In the Fifth Circuit, Medellín used the ICJ’s contemporaneous decision
in Avena to argue that despite procedural default rules, the court must
review and reconsider his case.117 The Fifth Circuit issued two important

51, 53 (2012) (“In Medellín v. Texas, the Court reasoned that the treaties granting jurisdiction to the
ICJ were non-self-executing and thus not enforceable unless implemented into law by Congress.”
(footnote omitted)); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause
and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 602 (2008) (“Medellín . . . is best
understood to have found the treaty at issue non-self-executing because the treaty imposed an
obligation that required the exercise of nonjudicial discretion.”); Ernest A. Young, Treaties as
“Part of Our Law,” 88 TEX. L. REV. 91, 119 (2009) (“U.S. treaties generally do not ‘purport to
convert the decisions and actions of international institutions into self-executing federal law.’
Medellín interpreted the VCCR and its Optional Protocol to be consistent with this pattern.”
(footnote omitted) (quoting Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural
Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1589 (2003))). But see Medellín v.
Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 533 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[The VCCR] ‘is itself self-executing
and judicially enforceable.’” (quoting id. at 555 (Breyer, J., dissenting)); Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S.
at 372 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is common ground that the [Vienna] Convention is ‘selfexecuti[ng].’” (quoting S. EXEC. REP. NO. 91-9, at 5 (1969))).
110. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 501.
111. Id. (citing Brief for Respondent at 2, Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (No. 06984)).
112. Id. (citing Brief for Petitioner at 6–7, Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (No. 06984)).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 501–02.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 502.
117. Id. at 503; see also Brief for Petitioner at 12, Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008)
(No. 06-984).
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and distinct holdings.118 First, the court held the VCCR did not confer
enforceable individual rights.119 Second, the court found that, without
regard to Avena, the court was bound by Breard, which held VCCR claims
were subject to procedural default rules.120
In December 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to
Medellín to determine whether the ICJ holding bound domestic courts.121
Before the U.S. Supreme Court could hear arguments, officials within the
Bush Administration began to debate whether to take a position on these
issues.122 Advisors were aware of the President’s reputation in certain
foreign capitals as a unilateralist eager to exercise executive power in
breach of international norms.123 Additionally, Administration officials
recognized the importance of Avena but were mindful of the authority of
the state of Texas to carry out the death sentence a Texas jury imposed.124
The President had little desire to interfere with state convictions,
particularly given his previous opposition in Montoya.125 The initial
inclination of some officials in the Bush Administration was to ignore the
decision of the ICJ.126 Some advisors believed the federal government had
no independent authority to interfere with state convictions.127 Texas
Governor Rick Perry and Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott were
known as staunch proponents for states’ rights, and some in the Bush
Administration anticipated they would both publicly criticize any
interference and remind the public of the President’s position in the
Montoya case.128
Others in the White House proposed a firmer response—to withdraw
from the Optional Protocol.129 However, there was concern, particularly at
the State Department, that both withdrawal from the Optional Protocol and
noncompliance with the ICJ order would only reinforce the belief that the
United States was neither respectful of the rights of other nations nor in
compliance with international law.130 In addition, other Administration
officials feared this perception would further encourage European public
opposition to U.S. policy and would likely discourage European
118. See Medellín v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 280 (5th Cir. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Medellín v.
Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
119. Id. at 280.
120. Id.
121. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 498.
122. Personal Account of Alberto R. Gonzales, supra note 27.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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governments from working with the United States in Afghanistan and
Iraq.131
The lack of consensus within the White House led to intense debate
over the appropriate responses to both Avena and Medellín.132 Based on
recommendations from senior aides, the President decided to issue a
directive that state courts give effect to Avena.133 Simultaneously, the
President decided that to avoid future entanglements with the ICJ, the
United States would withdraw from the Optional Protocol.134 On February
28, 2005, President Bush issued such a memorandum to the Attorney
General that directed state courts to give effect to Avena in accordance
with general principles of comity.135 A week later, on March 7, 2005,
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice informed the United Nations that the
United States withdrew from the Optional Protocol and no longer
recognized the ICJ’s jurisdiction regarding the VCCR.136 The February
28th memorandum was intended to please international allies who would
view the presidential directive as an affirmative step toward compliance
with an international court decision.137 The March 7th letter satisfied the
President’s respect of federalism as it eliminated further interference by the
ICJ on matters of state convictions.138
After the President issued his memorandum, the U.S. Supreme Court
heard arguments in Medellín. The Court considered whether either Avena
or President Bush’s memorandum bound the states.139 The U.S. Supreme
Court began its analysis by addressing whether the ICJ judgments bound
the United States with respect to VCCR violations.140 The U.S. Supreme
Court could have avoided this issue if it determined that there was no
enforceable individual right afforded under the VCCR. While such a
holding may have conflicted with the ICJ, it would have permitted the
Court to avoid a broader holding that the ICJ’s decisions have no authority
in U.S. courts.
Though the Court acknowledged that the United States had an
international obligation under the VCCR, the Court focused on whether
Avena produced any domestic legal effects on court proceedings.141 If the
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 498 (2008).
140. Id. at 499–500.
141. Id. at 504 (“No one disputes that the Avena decision—a decision that flows from the
treaties through which the United States submitted to ICJ jurisdiction with respect to Vienna
Convention disputes—constitutes an international law obligation on the part of the United States.
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Court ascertained an automatic domestic legal effect, then the judgment of
the ICJ would apply in state and federal courts of its own force.142 The
Court first looked at the treaties that created the ICJ and the United Nations
to determine if those treaties mandated automatic domestic legal effect to
the ICJ’s decisions.143
Customarily, the first step to determine whether a treaty has binding
domestic effect starts with an inquiry into whether the treaty is “selfexecuting” or “non-self-executing.”144 If a treaty is self-executing, it
becomes binding domestic law of its own accord.145 On the other hand, if a
treaty is non-self-executing, it creates an international commitment upon
the United States but cannot create binding domestic law unless Congress
enacts implementing legislation.146
The U.S. Supreme Court decided that its task was to determine whether
the Optional Protocol, the Charter of the United Nations, or the ICJ Statute
was self-executing.147 The Court concluded they were not self-executing
and thus the ICJ’s holding in Avena was not automatically binding
domestic law.148
Surprisingly, the Court assumed, without deciding, that Article 36
granted enforceable individual rights.149 This assumption leaves
unanswered the existence of an individual right and encourages foreign
nationals to continue to challenge federal and state convictions on the basis
of the VCCR. Respectfully, under the doctrine of separation of powers, it
is the rule of the Court to answer these questions. Additionally, as a matter
of judicial economy, the Court should have answered this question in the
negative.
The Optional Protocol requires that: “Disputes arising out of the
interpretation or application of the [VCCR] shall lie within the compulsory

But not all international law obligations automatically constitute binding federal law enforceable in
United States courts. The question we confront here is whether the Avena judgment has automatic
domestic legal effect such that the judgment of its own force applies in state and federal courts.”).
142. Id. at 504.
143. Id. at 507–14.
144. Id. at 504–05; see also Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 254 (1829); United States
v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 63 (1833).
145. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 505.
146. Id. at 504–05 (noting that this distinction was well explained in Foster); id. at 505 n.2
(“The label ‘self-executing’ has on occasion been used to convey different meanings. What we
mean by ‘self-executing’ is that the treaty has automatic domestic effect as federal law upon
ratification. Conversely, a ‘non-self-executing’ treaty does not by itself give rise to domestically
enforceable federal law. Whether such a treaty has domestic effect depends upon implementing
legislation passed by Congress.”).
147. Id. at 506 n.4.
148. Id. at 506.
149. Id. The Court made no determination about the self-executing nature of the VCCR.
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jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.”150 Importantly, the
Optional Protocol does not address the effect of an ICJ judgment and
whether states must comply with these judgments.151 There is nothing
about enforcement, only jurisdiction.152 In the Court’s citation to the
signatory nations’ post-ratification understandings of the Treaty, the Court
reified the understanding that the ICJ judgments did not bind the Court.153
Of the forty-seven nations that were parties to the Optional Protocol and
the 171 nations that were parties to the VCCR at the time, Medellín did not
identify one as a nation that treated ICJ judgments as binding domestic
law.154 Any obligation to actually comply with an order from the ICJ, the
Court concluded, must come from the U.N. Charter, specifically the
provision that addresses the effect of ICJ decisions.155
Article 94(1) of the U.N. Charter requires that “[e]ach Member of the
United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the [ICJ] in any
case to which it is a party.”156 The U.S. Supreme Court held that this
phrasing was not a directive to U.S. state and federal courts because the
U.N. Charter does not require that the United States “shall” or “must”
comply with an ICJ decision, nor does it appear that the Senate intended
this result when it ratified these words.157 While that is sufficient to prove
that the treaty is non-self-executing, the Court then stated that the sole
remedy for noncompliance is a referral by an aggrieved state to the United
Nations Security Council.158 This nonjudicial remedy was evidence to the
Court that the United Nations did not intend for ICJ judgments to be
enforceable in domestic courts.159
Finally, the ICJ Statute, which was incorporated into the U.N. Charter,
provided even more evidence that the ICJ’s judgments did not constitute
automatic binding domestic law.160 The ICJ Statute states that the purpose
of the court is to “arbitrate disputes between national governments.”161 The
U.S. Supreme Court interpreted this provision to mean that the ICJ cannot
allow Medellín, in his individual capacity, to be a party to an ICJ
proceeding.162
The Court then turned to the President’s memorandum to see if the
150. Id. at 507 (alteration in original) (quoting Optional Protocol, supra note 8, 21 U.S.T. at
326, 596 U.N.T.S. at 488).
151. Id. at 507–08.
152. Id. at 508.
153. Id. at 516–17.
154. Id. at 516.
155. Id. at 508.
156. Id. (quoting U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 509.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 511.
161. Id. (quoting Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 355 (2006)).
162. Id. at 511–12.
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Commander in Chief of the United States could change the Court’s
determination that the ICJ judgment in Avena was nonbinding.163
Youngstown dictates that the President may act only with either Congress’s
or the Constitution’s permission.164 According to the Court, while the
President is given great deference in the area of foreign affairs and treaty
interpretation, he cannot unilaterally convert a non-self-executing treaty
into a self-executing one.165 The result of the Court’s decision was that
Medellín had no ability to enforce the review and reconsideration the ICJ
required in Avena. Practically, the Court could have avoided a holding
about the President’s power or the weight of ICJ decisions with an
unequivocal initial declaration that there did not exist an enforceable
individual right.
II. THE DOMESTIC STORY OF FOREIGN
NATIONAL CONSULAR RIGHTS
The U.S. Supreme Court left two questions unanswered in Medellín: (1)
163. Id. at 523.
164. Id. at 524 (referencing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)).
Youngstown is a seminal case that addresses the scope of inherent presidential power (i.e., without
express constitutional or statutory authority). In the midst of the Korean War, the United
Steelworkers Union announced a nationwide strike. President Truman, fearful that a shortage of
steel products could endanger the nation and war effort in Korea, issued an order that permitted the
Secretary of Commerce to take possession of steel mills and to operate them. Youngstown, 343 U.S.
at 583. After he issued the order, President Truman reported the action to Congress, which took no
action in response to the seizure of the mills. Id. The Court ultimately declared the seizure
unconstitutional. Id. at 588–89. In his famous concurring opinion, Justice Jackson articulated three
zones of presidential authority:
Justice Jackson’s familiar tripartite scheme provides the accepted framework
for evaluating executive action in this area. First, ‘[w]hen the President acts
pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its
maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that
Congress can delegate.’ Second, ‘[w]hen the President acts in absence of either a
congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own
independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may
have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.’ . . . Finally,
‘[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied
will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb,’ and the Court can sustain his
actions ‘only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.’
Medellín, 552 U.S. at 524–25 (first, second, and fourth alterations in original) (citations omitted)
(quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637–38 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring)).
165. See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 525; see also id. at 562 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Thus, insofar
as foreign policy impact, the interrelation of treaty provisions, or any other matter within the
President’s special treaty, military, and foreign affairs responsibilities might prove relevant, such
factors favor, rather than militate against, enforcement of the judgment before us.”); Jama v. ICE,
543 U.S. 335, 336 (2005) (noting Court’s “customary policy of deference to the President in
matters of foreign affairs”).
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whether there is an enforceable individual right to consular notification,
and, if so, (2) what is the remedy for a violation of that right? For ease of
discussion, it is best to turn first to the question of a remedy. As far back as
Breard, the U.S. Supreme Court was clear that “[e]ven were Breard’s
[VCCR] claim properly raised and proved, it is extremely doubtful that the
violation should result in the overturning of a final judgment of conviction
without some showing that the violation had an effect on the trial.”166 The
Court in Sanchez-Llamas grappled with the application of the exclusionary
rule to a violation of the VCCR. It determined that there was no reason to
invoke constitutional protection for a violation that other interests
adequately secured.167 Thus there is no remedy available under the
Constitution, or federal or state legislation. There is no remedy provided by
treaty or international agreement. Likewise, no U.S. court provides a
remedy. Although this Article now turns to the question of the existence of
an individual right, the discussion may be presently, and for the foreseeable
future, purely academic since no remedy appears available.
A. International Law as a Source of the Right to
Consular Notification
It is necessary to turn first to the text of the VCCR to see if this treaty is
self-executing. As discussed above, if the VCCR is self-executing, it
becomes immediately binding as U.S. law. However, even if the treaty
were self-executing and imposed an automatic domestic obligation on
courts to recognize a right, without a remedy to attach to such a violation,
any transgression of non-notification becomes meaningless as a legal
matter. At most, a promotion of “awareness” of the importance of
notification of consular rights (1) ensures reciprocal treatment of
Americans and (2) encourages positive foreign policy press. In fact, this is
exactly the strategy that the Department of State adopted in its public
awareness program for Article 36.168 To confuse matters further, the
Department pronounces in its awareness literature that the VCCR is selfexecuting and encourages American law enforcement to take this
obligation seriously.169 Not surprisingly, the State Department notes that
the “most significant consequence [of non-notification] is that the United
States will be seen as a country that does not take its international legal

166. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 373 (1998).
167. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 350 (2006).
168. DEP’T OF STATE MANUAL, supra note 13, at 6 (explaining that the VCCR is selfexecuting); id. at 29 (stating that reciprocity is the guiding principle in applying consular
notification rights); id. at 31.
169. Id. at 6 (“Treaties such as the VCCR . . . are binding on federal, state, and local
government officials to the extent they pertain to matters within such officials’ competence as a
matter of international law and the U.S. Constitution.”).
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obligations seriously.”170 While the Department of State did undertake
efforts to promote awareness of consular notification,171 these efforts
cannot and do not make consular notification more than a nominal
obligation.172
Next, it is essential to consider customary international law as a
possible international basis for an enforcement mechanism.173 Customary
international law traditionally includes two components: (1) state practice
and (2) opinio juris, the latter of which is the belief that a legal obligation
exists for such practice.174 The Sixth Circuit in Emuegbunam found no
evidence that any other nation-state implemented a remedy for violations
of Article 36 with regard to criminal defendants.175 Therefore, the
remedies, if any, are available through political channels from country to
country. Use of these channels relies on the good faith of each individual
country and its government and takes the “right” out of the hands of the
individuals who suffer the violation.176
B. Domestic Constitution as a Source for the Right to
Consular Notification
An individual right to consular notification is not found within the
VCCR or other international sources. However, it is still necessary to
consider whether such a right exists under American notions of due
process. Synonymous with the term “alien,” a foreign national is any
170. Id. at 31.
171. See, e.g., Training and Outreach by the State Department, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
http://travel.state.gov/content/travel/english/consularnotification/training-outreach.html (last visited
Apr. 11, 2014).
172. If the picture for consular notification is bleak with a self-executing treaty, it would be
beyond the pale for a non-self-executing treaty that must wait for Congress or individual states to
implement it. Although consular notification would still exist as an “international obligation”
between nations, there would be no way to enforce such an obligation, especially for individuals.
This rabbit hole of executing versus non-self-executing treaties could continue if another treaty
could be found to contain language implicating consular notification. But the same problem would
persist without dedicated language of a remedy that is executed into U.S. law—such a “right”
remains properly nothing more than a privilege granted by conscientious law enforcement. Thus,
arguments to the executing nature of the VCCR become unimportant to the overall question
because the text of the convention offers no remedy and none can be implied.
173. The State Department found customary international law as a source of the obligation. See
DEP’T OF STATE MANUAL, supra note 13, at 46.
174. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 (1987).
175. United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 393 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[N]o country
remedies violations of the Vienna Convention through its criminal justice system. ‘These practices
evidence a belief among Vienna Convention signatory nations that the treaty’s dictates simply are
not enforceable in a host nation’s criminal courts[.]’” (second alteration in original) (citation
omitted) (quoting United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir. 2000))).
176. For examples of nation-state remedies, see generally JOHN QUIGLEY ET AL., THE LAW OF
CONSULAR ACCESS: A DOCUMENTARY GUIDE 141 (2010).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

23

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 3

708

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

individual who is not a citizen or national of the United States.177 This term
does not distinguish between those who cross the border legally or
illegally; it serves only to identify a person as a citizen of a foreign land. It
is immediately clear that those who are citizens of the United States
receive all the protections and guarantees of the Constitution, but it is less
clear what aliens are entitled to receive.
The contours of due process may be different regarding foreign
nationals and citizens, especially in the deportation context.178 This
asymmetrical application does not extend to the criminal context, where
courts offer foreign nationals the full panoply of rights available to a
citizen criminal defendant.179 The question is whether, in addition to these
rights, law enforcement must also inform a foreign national criminal
defendant of his ability to notify his consulate? To the extent any
requirement in this area existed, it could arise only from the same
constitutional foundations as the Miranda warnings.
Justice Earl Warren noted in Miranda that its questions “go to the roots
of our concepts of American criminal jurisprudence: the restraints society
must observe consistent with the Federal Constitution in prosecuting
individuals for crime.”180 The Court’s holding was meant to “insure that
what was proclaimed in the Constitution had not become just a ‘form of
words,’ in the hands of government officials.”181 Thus, if the Court deemed
the problem of consular notification to be of a constitutional dimension,
then the Court would have the authority to require states to issue such
notifications.182
177. RUTH E. WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41753, ASYLUM AND “CREDIBLE FEAR” ISSUES
IN U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY 1 n.1 (2011) (“The term ‘foreign national’ is synonymous with ‘alien,’

which is the term the Immigration and Nationality Act §101(a)(3) defines as a person who is not a
citizen or national of the United States.”).
178. In 1950, Justice Minton famously proclaimed that “[w]hatever the procedure authorized
by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.” United States ex rel.
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
179. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 350 (2006) (“A foreign national detained
on suspicion of crime, like anyone else in our country, enjoys under our system the protections of
the Due Process Clause. Among other things, he is entitled to an attorney, and is protected against
compelled self-incrimination.”); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (“‘The
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens. . . . These
provisions are universal in their application to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without
regard to any differences of race, of color, or nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a
pledge of the protection of equal laws. . . . ’ [I]t must be concluded that all persons within the
territory of the United States are entitled to the protection guaranteed by those amendments, and
that even aliens shall not be held to answer for a capital or other infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a grand jury, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.” (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886))).
180. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966).
181. Id. at 444 (citation omitted) (citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.
385, 392 (1920)).
182. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 346.
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To the Court, the driving force behind Miranda warnings was to give
meaning and life to the constitutional guarantees of the right against selfincrimination and the right to an attorney. Without protections, “an
individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody,
surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of
persuasion . . . cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to speak.”183
This feeling of compulsion would no doubt heighten in the case of a
foreign national. Beyond the common language and cultural barriers, a
fundamental misunderstanding of how the system works may exist.
Procedural protections must be in place because “[u]nless adequate
protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in
custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly
be the product of free choice.”184
However, the privilege against self-incrimination is inextricably linked
to the right to counsel.185 A warning about the right against selfincrimination is insufficient to protect the right; there must be “a right to
consult with counsel prior to questioning, but also to have counsel present
during any questioning.”186 Hence, Miranda warnings are expanded to
include the right to an attorney and even that the government can provide
an attorney.187 Ostensibly, counsel could also help parse out the unique
difficulties of being a foreign national in custody. Whether this would be
successful for the detainee depends not only upon the detainee’s awareness
of the right to counsel but also upon the belief that this right truly exists—
something that may prove difficult given different cultural expectations of
the judicial process.
The protection of the right against self-incrimination hinges on first
being informed of that right.188 If the police inform a suspect of his rights,
then it “will show the individual that his interrogators are prepared to
recognize his privilege should he choose to exercise it.”189 Moreover, it
insulates the poor or uneducated defendant:
The defendant who does not ask for counsel is the very
defendant who most needs counsel. We cannot penalize a
defendant who, not understanding his constitutional rights,
does not make the formal request and by such failure
demonstrates helplessness. To require the request would be to
favor the defendant whose sophistication or status had
183. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461.
184. Id. at 458.
185. Id. at 469.
186. Id. at 470.
187. Id.at 473–74.
188. Id. at 467–68 (“At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he
must first be informed in a clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent.”).
189. Id. at 468.
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fortuitously prompted him to make it.190
Foreign nationals are precisely within the ambit of this protection.
While lower courts differ on whether the VCCR creates an individual
right, all courts agree that this right, if it exists, is not fundamental.191
Fundamental rights are those rights essential to ordered liberty in society
and are deeply rooted in history and tradition.192 Thus, substantive due
process might be a foundation on which to build this fundamental right, but
[s]ubstantive due process will always pay a high degree of
deference to congressional and executive judgment, especially
when they concur, as to what is reasonable policy under
conditions of particular times and circumstances. Close to the
maximum of respect is due from the judiciary to the political
departments in policies affecting security and alien
exclusion.193
If Congress and the Executive take no action in support of consular
notification as a fundamental right, or in the provision of a remedy, then it
is unlikely the courts will do so on their own. The Court in Sanchez190. Id. at 471 (quoting People v. Dorado, 398 P.2d 361, 369–70 (Cal. 1965)).
191. Some courts have recognized that the VCCR confers a private right of action. See, e.g.,
Osagiede v. United States, 543 F.3d 399, 411 (7th Cir. 2008); Jogi v. Voges, 480 F.3d 822, 824
(7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 883 (9th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Esparza-Ponce, 193 F.3d 1133, 1138–39 (9th Cir. 1999); Standt v. City of New York, 153
F. Supp. 2d 417, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); United States v. Briscoe, 69 F. Supp. 2d 738, 745 (D.V.I.
1999), aff’d, 234 F.3d 1266 (3d Cir. 2000); United States v. Torres-Del Muro, 58 F. Supp. 2d 931,
933 (C.D. Ill. 1999); United States v. Hongla-Yamche, 55 F. Supp. 2d 74, 78 (D. Mass. 1999);
State v. Prasertphong, 75 P.3d 675, 688 (Ariz. 2003), opinion supplemented on other grounds, 76
P.3d 438 (Ariz. 2003), judgment vacated on other grounds, 541 U.S. 1039 (2004). Other courts
have not recognized an individual’s private right of action under the VCCR. See, e.g., United States
v. Navarro-Flores, 421 F. App’x 863, 866 (10th Cir. 2011); Lopez v. Wallace, 325 F. App’x 782,
784 (11th Cir. 2009); Jeremiah v. Burnette, 297 F. App’x 854, 856 (11th Cir. 2008); United States
v. Longo, 280 F. App’x 914, 915 (11th Cir. 2008); Gandara v. Bennett, 528 F.3d 823, 825 (11th
Cir. 2008); Cardenas v. Dretke, 405 F.3d 244, 253 (5th Cir. 2005); Medellín v. Dretke, 371 F.3d
270, 280 (5th Cir. 2004); Mendez v. Roe, 88 F. App’x 165, 167 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Banaban, 85 F. App’x 395, 396 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 394
(6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 198 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Umeh, 762 F. Supp. 2d 658, 664 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, 2013 WL 2460471 (2d Cir. 2013); Diaz v.
Van Norman, 351 F. Supp. 2d 679, 681 (E.D. Mich. 2005); Valle v. State, 70 So. 3d 530, 553 (Fla.
2011); Lugo v. State, 2 So. 3d 1, 17 (Fla. 2008); Gordon v. State, 863 So. 2d 1215, 1221 (Fla.
2003); Rahmani v. State, 898 So. 2d 132, 134 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Rodriguez v. State, 837
So. 2d 478, 481 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); People v. Najera, 864 N.E.2d 324, 327 (Ill. App. Ct.
2007); Gomez v. Com., 152 S.W.3d 238, 242 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004); In re Interest of Antonio O., 784
N.W.2d 457, 464 (Neb. Ct. App. 2010); State v. Gegia, 809 N.E.2d 673, 681 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004);
State v. Sanchez-Llamas, 108 P.3d 573, 574 (Or. 2005), aff’d, 548 U.S. 341 (2006); Cauthern v.
State, 145 S.W.3d 571, 626 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004).
192. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
193. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 222 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
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Llamas explicitly said that the concerns regarding consular notification
were incompatible with the concerns behind Miranda.194 At best, improper
consular notification may be a piece of the puzzle to defendants who make
larger arguments about the voluntary nature of confessions or ineffective
assistance of counsel.
III. DOMESTIC CREATION OF CONSULAR
NOTIFICATION AS A RIGHT
If the foundation for the right to consular notification does not exist in a
treaty, customary international law, or the Constitution as a product of due
process, then legislators may nevertheless still create it. Nothing prevents
the federal government or any of the fifty individual states from
implementing and enforcing the right and including a proper remedy.
A. Federal Creation of Consular Notification as a Right
On July 14, 2008, House Representatives Howard Berman and Zoe
Lofgren introduced a bill titled the “Avena Case Implementation Act of
2008.”195 This bill, if passed, would have executed the treaty and made it
binding domestic law.196 The bill purported to carry out U.S. obligations
under the VCCR and to enable those who had experienced an Article 36
violation to instigate a civil action to obtain “appropriate relief.”197 Such
relief was defined to be “any declaratory or equitable relief necessary to
secure the rights.”198 Moreover, where criminal prosecution was
concerned, relief also included “any[thing] required to remedy the harm
done by the violation, including the vitiation of the conviction or sentence
where appropriate.”199 However, this bill was referred to the House
Committee on the Judiciary and died in committee.200
Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont introduced a similar bill titled
“Consular Notification Compliance Act of 2011.”201 This bill also
purported to attach a remedy to Article 36 via domestic implementation.202
Senator Leahy’s bill required that defendants convicted and sentenced to
death by state courts could bring a consular notification claim
194. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 362 (2006) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
195. Avena Case Implementation Act of 2008, H.R. 6481, 110th Cong. (2d Sess. 2008),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110hr6481ih/pdf/BILLS-110hr6481ih.pdf.
196. Id.
197. Id. § 2(a).
198. Id. § 2(b)(1).
199. Id. § 2(b)(2).
200. See H.R. 6481 (110th) Avena Case Implementation Act of 2008, GOVTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr6481 (last visited Apr. 11, 2014).
201. Consular Notification Compliance Act of 2011, S. 1194, 112th Cong. (1st Sess 2011),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112s1194is/pdf/BILLS-112s1194is.pdf.
202. Id.
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notwithstanding any other federal or state law.203 This remedy would
override state procedural default rules.204 Once a court obtained
jurisdiction, the court would stay the execution pending review of the
claim.205 The defendant would then have to prove actual prejudice from the
violation and, if successful, could win a new sentencing hearing or even a
new trial.206 Such a remedy would not go as far as to apply the
exclusionary rule, as argued for in Sanchez-Llamas, but would give effect
in domestic courts to the ICJ’s Avena decision. It would enable courts to
review cases in light of alleged Article 36 violations and remedy those
violations through a domestic process. This bill was referred to the Senate
Committee of the Judiciary in June of 2011, but subsequently died in
committee.207
B. State Creation of Consular Notification as a Right
Currently, the federal government does not provide a remedy (or even a
right to review cases) for violations of Article 36. However, at the state
level, the story is different. Almost three-quarters of the states have dealt
with VCCR violations in their case law, which demonstrates that the issue
is broader than one isolated example in Texas.208 While state courts have
varied in how to process the VCCR, it does not appear that any state has
approved suppression as a remedy. Some states have rejected the
preliminary notion that the VCCR creates a judicially enforceable
individual right209 or that it is enforceable at all.210 This rejection prevents
203. Id. § 4(a)(1).
204. Id.
205. Id. § 4(a)(2).
206. Id. § 4(a)(3).
207. See S. 1194 (112th): Consular Notification Compliance Act of 2011, GOVTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s1194 (last visited Apr. 6, 2014).
208. These thirty-seven states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. See infra notes 210–13, 218.
209. Seven states—Alabama, Kentucky, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Tennessee, and
Wisconsin—have rejected an enforceable individual right stemming from the VCCR. See, e.g.,
Albarran v. State, 96 So. 3d 131, 151 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011); Gomez v. Commonwealth, 152
S.W.3d 238, 242 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004); State v. King, 858 A.2d 4, 13 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2004); State v. Martinez-Rodriguez, 33 P.3d 267, 274 (N.M. 2001); State v. Sanchez-Llamas, 108
P.3d 573, 578 (Or. 2005); Young Bok Song v. State, M2010-02054-CCA-R3-CO, 2011 WL
2713738, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 13, 2011); State v. Navarro, 659 N.W.2d 487, 494 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2003). From these cases it is clear that four of these states—Alabama, Kentucky, New Jersey,
and Tennessee—have additionally rejected suppression as a remedy for any violations even if the
rights are individually enforceable.
210. Arkansas incorrectly interpreted Medellín to hold that the VCCR is not domestically
enforceable and thus courts do not need to apply it. Gikonyo v. State, 283 S.W.3d 631, 636 (Ark.
Ct. App. 2008).
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courts from taking the next step to remedy any violations in a criminal
context. Of the states that allow for an individual right (or evade the issue
like the Supreme Court), their courts universally hold that suppression is
not an appropriate remedy.211 These courts offer no other remedy.
A few state courts have dealt with the issue superficially and focused on
the procedural defects of claims in order to avoid the issue of consular
notification.212 These decisions are consistent with the long history of
federal consular notification litigation that uniformly holds that rights and
obligations under the VCCR are subject to state procedural default rules.213
These results are unsurprising. After the U.S. Supreme Court’s rejection
of the exclusionary rule in Sanchez-Llamas, state courts followed suit
(although, some courts had already rejected suppression as an appropriate
remedy long before that decision). As a Colorado court of appeals noted,
“The exclusionary rule deters only constitutional violations, not statutory
or treaty violations.”214 But what about casting an Article 36 violation in a
larger context, making it part of a voluntariness claim tied to Miranda or
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim? These arguments, too, have
failed to bring defendants any relief.215 Some states have gone even further,
as exemplified by a New York court’s holding that “[an Article 36]
violation is not a circumstance affecting the voluntariness of a statement,
and [] there is no reason for evidence of such a violation to be considered

211. Twenty-one states have found that suppression is not a valid remedy without regard to the
existence of a right. These states include: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Washington. See, e.g., Zuboff v. State, No. A-8692,
2006 WL 3114386, at *21 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006); State v. Prasertphong, 75 P.3d 675, 688 (Ariz.
2003) (en banc); People v. Enraca, 269 P.3d 543, 560 (Cal. 2012); People v. Preciado-Flores, 66
P.3d 155, 161–62 (Colo. App. 2002); Conde v. State, 860 So. 2d 930, 953 (Fla. 2003); AnayaPlasencia v. State, 642 S.E.2d 401, 403 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); People v. Vasquez, 824 N.E.2d 1071,
1076 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); Zavala v. State, 739 N.E.3d 135, 140 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); State v.
Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d 38, 46 (Iowa 2003); State v. Rosas, 17 P.3d 379, 386 (Kan. Ct. App.
2000); State v. Garcia, 26 So. 3d 159, 166 (La. Ct. App. 2009); Commonwealth v. Diemer, 785
N.E.2d 1237, 1244–45 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003); Cardona-Rivera v. State, 33 S.W.3d 625, 627 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2000); Garcia v. State, 17 P.3d 994, 997 (Nev. 2001); People v. Ortiz, 17 A.D.3d 190, 191
(N.Y. App. Div. 2005); State v. Herrera, 672 S.E.2d 71, 79–80 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009); State v. Tuck,
766 N.E.2d 1065, 1067 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001); State v. Banda, 639 S.E.2d 36, 42, 43 (S.C. 2006);
Rocha v. State, 16 S.W.3d 1, 19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); State v. Kozlov, 276 P.3d 1207, 1227
(Utah Ct. App. 2012); Bell v. Commonwealth, 563 S.E.2d 695, 707 (Va. 2002); State v. Jamison,
20 P.3d 1010, 1016–17 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
212. See, e.g., State v. Arroyo, 935 A.2d 975, 979–80 n.3 (Conn. 2007); Rummer v. State, 722
N.W.2d 528, 536 (N.D. 2006); Commonwealth v. Cam Ly, 980 A.2d 61, 98 (Pa. 2009).
213. See supra Part I.
214. Preciado-Flores, 66 P.3d at 161.
215. See, e.g., Ledezma v. Iowa, 626 N.W.2d 134, 134 (Iowa 2001) (failing as part of an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim); Garcia, 26 So. 3d at 159 (failing as part of a voluntariness
claim).
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by a jury in that regard.”216 Cases like these virtually eliminate the
possibility of a defendant’s successful use of VCCR violations as a basis to
make a constitutional claim.
In those states that permit a defendant to raise a VCCR violation as a
defense, before the defendant is eligible for relief, the defendant must show
the lack of consular notification resulted in prejudice.217 In states that
require a showing of prejudice, the test for prejudice sometimes mirrors the
standard necessary to overcome procedural default, except the burden is on
the defendant. For example, Oklahoma devised a three-prong test for
prejudice:
(1) whether the defendant did not know he had a right to
contact his consulate for assistance; (2) whether he would
have availed himself of the right had he known of it; and (3)
whether it was likely that the consulate would have assisted
the defendant. . . . The defendant must present evidence
showing what efforts his consulate would have made to assist
in his criminal case.218
While a defendant in Oklahoma is not required to show that the
consular assistance would have made a difference in the outcome of the
trial, he must show that assistance would have been provided.219 Thus, the
Oregon Supreme Court, in a case eventually granted certiorari by the U.S.
Supreme Court, stated: “the only remedies for failures of consular
notification under the [VCCR] are diplomatic, political, or exist between
[signatory] states under international law.”220
While it is true that remedies may not exist in the VCCR, states are still
free to codify the VCCR and provide a remedy. As a Massachusetts court
noted, “In order to enable the full effect to be given to art. 36 . . . the
notifications it requires must be incorporated into the protocols of the State
and local law enforcement agencies.”221 Five states—California, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, and Oregon—either passed or proposed legislation that
references consular notification but does not include a remedy with this
language.
216. Ortiz, 17 A.D.3d at 191.
217. See, e.g., State v. Rosas, 17 P.3d 379, 385, 386 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Byron, 683
N.W.2d 317, 323 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004); Torres v. State, 120 P.3d 1184, 1187, 1188 (Okla. Crim.
App. 2005); State v. Lopez, 574 S.E.2d 210, 214 (S.C. Ct. App. 2002).
218. Torres, 120 P.3d at 1186; see also State v. Lopez, 633 N.W.2d 774, 783 (Iowa 2001)
(explaining that several federal courts apply this test to determine whether prejudice results from
Article 36 violations).
219. Torres, 120 P.3d at 1186, 1187. Although actual prejudice did exist in this case as to the
capital sentence, there was no need for a remedy as that sentence was suspended.
220. State v. Sanchez-Llamas, 108 P.3d 573, 578 (Or. 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting
United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 63–64 (1st Cir. 2000)).
221. Commonwealth v. Gautreaux, 941 N.E.2d 616, 622 (Mass. 2011).
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Oregon’s legislative efforts focus on the education of law enforcement,
but do not provide a remedy for VCCR violations. Oregon passed a statute
that requires authorities to train law enforcement to “[u]nderstand the
requirements of the [VCCR] and identify situations in which the officers
are required to inform a person of the person’s rights under the
convention.”222 Legislation from other states also provide no remedy and
require no compliance. Florida passed the strongest statutory language in
2001, which stated that failure to provide consular notification would not
be a defense in any criminal proceeding.223 California, too, codified the
VCCR into California Penal Code § 834c and § 5028.224 However, the
statutory language provides no remedy for the violation of either. Georgia
gives some effect to the treaty with its passage of Georgia Code Annotated
§ 42-4-14, which states, “When any person is confined, for any period, in
[a] jail . . . in compliance with Article 36 of the [VCCR], a reasonable
effort shall be made to determine the nationality of the person so
confined.”225 Again, Georgia provides no remedy for failure to make such a
reasonable effort. The Illinois legislature proposed a bill that goes a bit
further and requires that notice of this right (to be codified into the statute)
be given in open court.226 If such notice is not given, and if the defendant
can show prejudice as a result of the violation, then the court must allow
either for a continuance or a remand and new trial.227
Overall, although states do not frequently provide remedies for
violations, there may be a path forward in some states for defendants who
raise their claims at the proper times or who are able to show prejudice
from the denial of consultation. However, the burden is too high for most
defendants and only a small incentive (or direction) exists for law
enforcement to enforce notification. Therefore, the notification obligation
remains an international promise between nation-states left to political and
foreign policy authorities.
CONCLUSIONS
Three main conclusions are drawn from the consular rights litigation in
the United States. The first is the strong pronouncement that procedural
default rules that states invoke are paramount and the VCCR does not
override these laws. The U.S. Supreme Court reinforced this conclusion in
222. OR. REV. STAT. § 181.642(b)(2) (West, Westlaw through ch. 80 of 2014 Reg. Sess.).
223. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 901.26 (West, Westlaw through chapters in effect from the 2014 2d
Reg. Sess. of the 23rd Legis. through Mar. 31, 2014).
224. CAL. PENAL CODE § 834c(d) (West, Westlaw through ch. 10 of 2014 Reg. Sess.); id.
§ 5028(b).
225. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-4-14 (Lexis 2012).
226. S.B. 1906, 97th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2011), available at http://ilga.gov/legislation/97/SB/
PDF/09700SB1906lv.pdf.
227. Id.
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Breard: the VCCR intended nations to follow the treaty obligations “in
compliance with” national laws, which may include procedural default
rules. The U.S. Supreme Court reified this idea in Medellín, another case
where the defendant ran afoul of procedural default rules and the Court
firmly held them in place. The second conclusion is that there are binding
legal limits on the invocation of the right the VCCR creates (if there is
such a right). The procedural default rules provide some limits, but the
refusal to apply the exclusionary rule to violations of the VCCR and the
refusal to implement the decisions of the ICJ make these strictures all the
more clear. At best, pronouncements of international legal bodies deserve
“respectful consideration” but not implementation or enforcement.
Third, the U.S. Supreme Court missed an opportunity to deal cleanly
and correctly with the issue of consular notification. This speaks more to
what the Court failed to do than what it did. Without treaty language to
support the existence of an enforceable individual right (or any other
mechanism), there is no impetus for domestic implementation. Therefore,
states may make their own determinations as to consular notification when
the federal government does not guide the discussion via international
obligations. Consular notification has its place as an international
consideration and the VCCR is something law enforcement and foreign
nationals should be aware of—but its violation has no accompanying force.
Further, a decision from the Court on the absence of the right would stem
the tide of consular notification litigation and avoid any holding about
treaty interpretation or the binding nature of ICJ judgments.
In a concurring opinion in the First Circuit, two judges questioned the
use of the word “right” regarding the VCCR.228 They explained that Article
36 seems to use the word merely as a way to “implement . . . the treaty
obligations as between [nation-states]. Any other phrasing of the promise
as to what law enforcement officers will say to detainees would be
artificial and awkward.”229 Phrasing the duties that accompany consular
notification as something other than a “right” may be linguistically
awkward, but far more accurate. After a long history of litigation over the
meaning of Article 36, this right to consular notification is nothing more
than an international obligation between nations that nations may or may
not uphold. The Treaty itself does not make it a right, nor does any
governmental body within the United States. Rather than avoid this
question, the U.S. Supreme Court should have answered it in the negative:
the consular notification provision does not provide an enforceable
individual right.

228. United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir. 2000) (emphasis omitted).
229. Id.
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APPENDIX A: TIMELINE
1963

Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
opened for signature

1969

United States ratified the VCCR and Optional
Protocol

1982

Karl and Walter LaGrand commit robbery and
murder in Arizona and are arrested

1993

Medellín is arrested for rape and murder in
Texas

1997

Medellín sentenced to death

1998

Breard (citizen of Paraguay) set to be executed
in Virginia; raises consular notification rights;
executed anyway due to U.S. Supreme Court’s
conclusion, that same year, that he had
procedurally defaulted his right to raise the issue

1999

LaGrands executed in Arizona

2001

LaGrand case is decided by the ICJ

2003

Mexico filed suit in the ICJ against U.S. (Avena)
over the issue of consular relations

March 2004

Avena is decided by ICJ

December 2004

U.S. Supreme Court grants certiorari to Medellín

February 28, 2005

Bush issues Memo regarding Medellín

March 7, 2005

U.S. pulls out of Optional Protocol

2006

Sanchez-Llamas decision issued by Supreme
Court

2008

Medellín decision issued by Supreme Court
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